Communication and compatibility in systems of systems: Correctness-by-construction by Beek, Maurice ter et al.
ERCIM NEWS 102   July 2015 21
To address these issues our research
agenda is twofold. First, we investigate
established audit, security and safety
analysis methods to extract the relevant
high level security properties. Safety
analysis methods are typically used in
the peripheral domain and security
analysis methods in the backend. These
need to be combined as ‘safety and secu-
rity co-engineering’ to create a uniform
point of view for SoS high-level security
properties. This work is conducted in the
Artemis project ARROWHEAD and
contributed to the ARROWHEAD
framework [1]. Second, we investigate
how to represent aggregated information
in our assurance approaches [2], in the
FP7 project SECCRIT (Secure Cloud
Computing for Critical Infrastructure
IT).  
A first publication [3] related to safety
and security co-engineering presents an
evaluation of the methods in isolation.
For succeeding activities the security
analysis an approach based on the ISO
27005 and ETSI TS 102 165-1 standards
is used in recent work in ARROW-
HEAD. For the safety and reliability
analysis the IEC 60812 standard is used.
Both include an identification of unsat-
isfactory situations (threats and failure
modes) and a method for identifying
those with the highest risks. The system
is modelled using a dataflow diagram
for identifying threats and to motivate
decisions when extracting failure modes
from an existing catalogue. We have
performed an applicability analysis on
the resulting threats and failure modes to
filter out the relevant ones. In the end the
risks of the remaining threats and failure
modes were evaluated in detail. The
elicitation of threats was supported by a
series of workshops and interviews. Re-
sults have been applied to current design
of one of the project’s pilots. So far we
have conducted safety and security
analysis individually, and will extend
the range of methods. The next step will
involve modelling the process and in-
vestigating how to describe results to
conduct a combined analysis to develop
safety and security co-engineering, the
fundamentals of which will be con-
tributed to the ARROWHEAD frame-
work.
We have systematically modelled secu-
rity metrics for Cloud systems to con-
tribute to our assurance model (as intro-
duced in [2]). I.e. ISO27002, defines
‘high-level’ security metrics such as
strong passwords. This can be measured
by checking if corresponding tools (e.g.
PAM (see Link) are available in the con-
stituent components. A catalogue of high
level security metrics is being developed
and corresponding tool-support will be
provided. 
Promising initial results have already been
published, and form a basis of our research
agenda. They will be extended in future
projects (e.g. H2020 CREDENTIAL).
Link: 
http://www.linux-pam.org/Linux-PAM-
html/Linux-PAM_MWG.html
http://www.arrowhead.eu/
http://www.seccrit.eu
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In an increasingly smart, connected
world in which digital communications
outnumber all other forms of communi-
cation, it is important to understand the
complex underlying interconnections in
the numerous systems of systems that
govern our daily life. This requires a
deep understanding of all kinds of dif-
ferent communication and collaboration
strategies (e.g. client-server, peer-to-
peer and master-slave) used in em-
bedded or multi-component systems
and the risk of failures they entail (e.g.
message loss and deadlocks can have
severe repercussions on reliability,
safety and security).
A project involving ISTI-CNR and
Leiden University (the Netherlands)
considers fundamental notions para-
mount for the development of correct-
by-construction multi-component sys-
tems. Basic building blocks are reactive
components that interact with each
other via shared (external) actions; in-
Communication and Compatibility 
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Correctness-by-Construction
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Society is still trying to catch up with technology in the wake of the digital revolution of the last twenty
years. Current systems need to be both heterogeneous and able to deal with enormous volumes of data
coming from uncertain environments; consequently it is essential to be able to automatically assess the
correctness of interactions. To guarantee that a system of systems, comprising a conglomerate of
cooperating reactive components, can be trusted, and that the system as a whole behaves as intended,
requires a thorough understanding of its communication behaviour. Once local interactions are identified,
abstractions can support the identification of incompatibility of systems that should cooperate within a
larger system.
ternal actions are never shared. External
actions can be input or output to the
components to which they belong. Com-
ponents can be added in different phases
of construction allowing for hierarchi-
cally composed systems of systems. To
establish that components within a
system or a system and its environment
always interact correctly, a concept of
compatibility is needed. Compatibility
represents an aspect of successful com-
munication behaviour, a necessary in-
gredient for the correctness of a distrib-
uted system. Compatibility failures de-
tected in a system model may reveal im-
portant problems in the design of one or
more of its components that must be re-
paired before implementation.
In [1] a definition is given for compati-
bility of two components that should
engage in a dialogue free from message
loss and deadlocks. Message loss oc-
curs when one component sends a mes-
sage that cannot be received as input by
another component, whereas deadlock
occurs when a component is indefi-
nitely waiting for a message that never
arrives. The aim of the ideas developed
in [1] is to provide a formal framework
for the synthesis of asynchronous cir-
cuits and embedded systems. There the
approach is restricted to two compo-
nents and a closed environment, i.e. all
input (output) actions of one component
are output (input) actions of the other
component.
In [2] this approach is generalized to
distributed systems which consist of
several components, and within which
communication and interaction may
take place between more than two com-
ponents at the same time (e.g. broad-
casting). These multi-component sys-
tems are represented by team au-
tomata [3], originally introduced to
model groupware systems. Team au-
tomata represent a useful model to
specify intended behaviour and have
been shown to form a suitable formal
framework for lifting the concept of
compatibility to a multi-component set-
ting. They resemble the well-known I/O
automata in their distinction between
input (passive), output (active) and in-
ternal (private) actions, but an impor-
tant difference is that team automata im-
pose fewer a priori restrictions on the
role of the actions and the interactions
between the components [3]. In [2] em-
phasis is on team automata with interac-
tions based on mandatory synchronized
execution of common actions.
Together with the Universitat Politèc-
nica de Catalunya (Barcelona, Spain)
we plan to continue the approach of [2]
by investigating other composition
strategies and, in particular, focusing
on how to handle compositions based
on master-slave collaborations. In such
collaborations, input (the slave) is
driven by output (the master) under dif-
ferent assumptions ranging from slaves
that cannot proceed on their own to
masters that should always be followed
by slaves. Thus we address questions
such as “how is compatibility affected
when slaves are added?” and “in what
way does compatibility depend on the
collaboration among slaves?” Practical
solutions to these answers may have
strong impacts in various fields, such as
services computing and security.
Composition and modularity are
common in modern system design. So
compatibility checks considering
varying strategies significantly aid the
development of correct-by-construction
multi-component systems. Hence the
ideas in this project should serve the de-
velopment of techniques supporting the
design, analysis and verification of sys-
tems of systems.
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Special Theme: Trustworthy Systems of Systems  
The term systems-of-systems (SoS)
started to become relevant some 20
years ago, and accelerated as a research
area around 10 years ago. Although
some people tend to take SoS as a syn-
onym for large and complex systems,
the research community has arrived at a
fairly precise characterization of the
term: in an SoS, the elements, or con-
stituent systems, exhibit an operational
and managerial independence,
meaning that they can operate outside
the SoS context, and have different
owners. They choose to collaborate in
order to achieve a common goal, mani-
fested as an emergent property of the
SoS, i.e. a property that does not exist
in any of its parts in isolation. A recent
literature review [1] shows that the
field, so far, has been dominated by US
researchers focusing on military and
space applications. Key topics include:
architecture, communications, interop-
erability, modelling and simulation,
and also a number of properties where
dependability attributes, such as safety,
play an important role.
From its origins in the government
driven sectors, SoS are now spreading
Safety Analysis for Systems-of-Systems
by Jakob Axelsson
The introduction of systems-of-systems (SoS) necessitates the revision of common practices for
safety analysis. In the case of vehicle platooning, for instance, this means that an analysis has to
be carried out at the platoon level to identify principles for the safety of the SoS, and these
principles then have to be translated to safety goals and requirements on the individual trucks.
